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SPECTRES OF LAW & ECONOMICS 
William H. Widen* 
THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS, THE EROTICS OF THE MARKET. By Jeanne 
Lorraine Schroeder. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2004. Pp. 
318. $80. 
INTRODUCTION 
"Did you know that the first Matrix was designed to be a perfect human 
world? Where none suffered, where everyone would be happy? It was a 
disaster. "1 
There are spectres haunting law and economics - the spectres of 
G.W.F. Hegel2 and Jacques Lacan.3 This is one of the central theses of 
Professor Jeanne L. Schroeder's challenging new book: The Triumph 
of Venus, The Erotics of the Market ("Triumph of Venus").4 Schroeder 
uses insights inspired by the teachings of Hegel and the French 
psychoanalyst, Lacan, to critique some basic assumptions made by 
scholars who use economic ideas to investigate the law and legal 
institutions - the law and economics ("L&E") practitioners. The 
book devotes much space to criticism of Judge Posner's vision of law, 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, 
Florida, wwiden@law.miami.edu; A.B. 1980, Stanford; J.D. 1983, Harvard. Professor Widen 
practiced corporate and commercial law from 1984 to 2001 at Cravath, Swaine & Moore in 
New York City (since 1991 as a member of the Firm). -Ed. I am grateful for my 
conversations with Reza Dibadj, Patrick Gudridge, Arthur Jacobson, George Triantis, 
William Maker, and Robert Wallace about this project. 
l. THE MATRIX (Warner Studios 1999). 
2. Hegel is best known for the caricature of his triadic logical method - proceeding by 
search for a thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Hegel's writing style is complex and obscure, 
particularly his treatises on logic. Fortunately, Hegel's more accessible political treatise, 
Philosophy of Right, figures prominently in Professor Schroeder's analysis. See G. W. F. 
HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (H. B. Nisbet trans., Allen w. Wood 
ed., 2003) [hereinafter, HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT) . 
3. Lacan is known for advocating a return to the teaching of Sigmund Freud. As with 
Hegel, the writing style is complex and obscure. A reading of Hegel significantly influenced 
some of Lacan's theories. Interestingly, it appears that Lacan did not study the Philosophy of 
Right but instead Alexandre Kojeve's anthropological reading of the more complex 
Phenomenology of Spirit. See ANTHONY ELLIOTI, SOCIAL THEORY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 
IN TRANSITION 112 (1999). 
4. Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder is a Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of 
Law, Yeshiva University. 
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using it as a proxy for L&E scholarship generally.5 Professor 
Schroeder succinctly states her basic problem with L&E: 
In recent years, the study of markets in American jurisprudence has been 
expropriated by the self-styled "law-and-economics" movement, the 
dominant discourse of private law in America's most elite law schools. 
One of its appeals is that it gives an aura of scientific certainty and 
objectivity to legal analysis and normative policymaking. Despite its 
claim to scientific status, however, this scholarship is almost entirely 
devoid of methodological discussion and internal criticism, as though 
these matters were uncontroversial. (pp. 1-2) 
In Schroeder's view, L&E fails to engage in meaningful empirical 
research. Instead, its members spin out analyses and policy 
recommendations like armchair pundits, giving advice based on non­
falsifiable conclusions deduced from unexamined premises. The L&E 
movement is a "degenerating research program."6 As such, it spends 
more time protecting its theoretical core than discovering facts about 
the world. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, L&E has thrived due to 
an ineffective response from the critical left perspective. Schroeder 
finds inadequate critiques of L&E grounded in a form of romanticism 
suffering from flaws similar to those afflicting the utilitarian 
underpinnings of L&E itself - both view markets and market 
transactions as spheres of cold rationality (p. 2). 
Much L&E scholarship relies on the concepts of "perfect market" 
and "wealth maximization" to develop models designed to explain 
aspects of the law and legal institutions. Schroeder's project is to 
expose inconsistencies in these concepts that make them ill-suited 
both for descriptive and normative roles in these models. Moreover, 
the goal of "wealth maximization" is revealed as inconsistent with 
basic notions of property. Schroeder finds the defects in these 
concepts particularly troubling because their use may inhibit human 
freedom. For Hegelians, promotion of human freedom is the 
highest aim. 
From the foregoing, however, one should not get the idea that 
Schroeder's program amounts either to a tirade against market 
economies or a call to embrace a leftist political agenda. In fact, she 
makes clear that her analysis actually sees markets as performing a 
5. Judge Posner authored the leading text on law and economics. See RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2002). Recently, Professor Steven Shaven 
has published a competing textbook on law and economics. See STEVEN SHA YELL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004). Though it is beyond the scope of 
this essay to consider in detail whether Professor Shavell's approach differs sufficiently from 
Judge Posner's to avoid Professor Schroeder's critique, I indicate below Shavell's awareness 
of conceptual difficulties with wealth maximization and the ideal of the perfect market that 
Schroeder criticizes mainstream L&E for ignoring. 
6. P. 3. Professor Schroeder borrows the phrase "degenerating research program" from 
Imre Lakatos, the philosopher of science, and expressly uses it in his sense. 
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central role in the development of legal subjects (p. 143). Nor does 
Schroeder believe that an appeal to Lacan or Hegel licenses specific or 
detailed policy recommendations (pp. 4-5, 10). Accordingly, her 
agenda risks being accused of shortcomings ascribed to the critical 
legal-studies movement - particularly the charge that no alternative 
normative agenda emerges from the analysis.7 
This criticism may be deflected, at least partially, by Schroeder's 
identification of the L&E discourse as the "discourse of the 
university" in Lacanian parlance.8 University discourse claims to have 
scientific answers to policy questions when, in fact, this appeal to 
objectivity masks an ideological agenda, typically to preserve an 
existing allocation of power. For Schroeder, unless L&E is recognized 
in its true nature, it risks stifling important policy and political debate 
behind the veil of science. In this sense, the L&E discourse is anti­
freedom. Thus, one positive consequence of Schroeder's agenda might 
be promotion of more vigorous public debate over important 
economic issues on ethical grounds where now those issues might be 
taken as settled by economic-policy science.9 
By exposing the true underpinnings of L&E, Schroeder hopes that 
L&E practitioners will make more modest claims and return to the 
original teachings of Ronald Coase by shifting their focus to empirical 
research of actual markets. 
What we can do, as Coase pleads, is to study actual costs and actual 
behavior in actual markets on their own terms. Although we can retain 
the impossible ideal of the perfect market, we must set realistic goals 
based on contingent, empirical judgments as to the relative efficiency of 
possible actual market choices. (p. 148) 
Many professional economists already recognize the limitations 
inherent in neoclassical modeling of markets and human behavior and 
they are working to improve economic analysis in light of these 
7. See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 779 (1992). 
8. P. 5. Professor Schroeder provides an extensive analysis of this observation in Jeanne 
L. Schroeder, The Four Discourses of Law: A Lacanian Analysis of Legal Practice and 
Scholarship, 79 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2000); see also PAUL VERHAEGHE, DOES THE WOMAN 
EXIST? (Marc du Ry trans., rev. ed. 1999) (providing a book-length analysis of the Lacanian 
discourses). 
9. I take Schroeder's rejection of economic policy science as having two grounds. It 
stems from a rejection of pure utilitarian ethics (i.e., ethics that exclude basic notions of 
justice and fairness) and from the technical observation that, even if our ethical intuitions 
were captured by notions of utility maximization, we are rarely if ever in a position to 
competently perform the required calculation. I do not mean to suggest that economic­
policy science is divorced from ethics. See generally JOHN BROOME, ETHICS OUT OF 
ECONOMICS (1999). When pursuit of a policy is advocated because it is the "most efficient," 
opponents are left to advocate for the inefficient result, placing them at a rhetorical 
disadvantage unless they are prepared to challenge the claim of efficiency. The claim of 
efficiency typically is asserted as an empirical fact, thus not subject to challenge. 
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perceived shortcomings. 10 Though Professor Schroeder's project may 
be of interest to these economists, her work is targeted at those using 
economics in the legal academy that have not yet awakened to the 
deficiencies of the brand of economics used by L&E.11 
Triumph of Venus is structured in five chapters, interlaced with 
references to Greek mythology that illustrate aspects of Schroeder's 
arguments.12 The first chapter explores theories on the nature of gift 
transactions (using Pandora) as a prelude to her second-chapter 
critique of the concept of the perfect market (using Orpheus). The 
third chapter analyzes the property theories of Calabresi and 
Melamed13 (using Narcissus) as preamble to Chapter Four, which 
analyzes the deficiencies of the concept of wealth maximization (using 
10. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: A Perspective on 
Intuitive Judgment and Choice, Nobel Prize Lecture (December 8, 2002), available at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2002/kahnemann-lecture.pdf; see also BRUNO S. 
FREY & MA ITHIAS BENZ, FROM IMPERIALISM TO INSPIRATION: A SURVEY OF ECONOMICS 
AND PSYCHOLOGY (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 118, 2002) 
(discussing bounded rationality, non-selfish behavior, and the economics of happiness); 
George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON. 715 
(2000) (exploring how to incorporate psychological and sociological concepts into economic 
models of behavior); Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. 
ECON. REV. 359 (1994) (criticizing neoclassical economics for modeling a frictionless and 
static world that fails to explain economic performance over time). Further, some reflection 
on method is occurring in the legal academy. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Foreword, 
Revisiting Gibson and Kraakman's Efficiency Story, 28 J. CORP. L. 499 (2003). And, some 
other legal academics are, like Professor Schroeder, beginning to look for alternate 
approaches to L&E. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Beyond Facile Assumptions and Radical 
Assertions: A Case for "Critical Legal Economics," 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1 155 (2003); Devon 
W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 1 12 YALE L.J. 
1757 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 
(Francisco Valdes et al., eds., 2002)). 
11 .  Professor Schroeder's concerns are not limited to the use of neoclassical price theory 
but extend to the L&E movement's misuse of new work being performed by behavioral 
economists. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Stumbling Block: Freedom, Rationality, and Legal 
Scholarship, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 267-69 (2002). Indeed, she finds the use of 
behavioral economics by legal academics potentially more destructive of freedom than 
traditional L&E. Acceptance of behavioral economics might lead to laws discouraging 
activity that, though not harmful, is considered irrational. See also Donald Cooper, 
Commentary: Misbehavioral Economics, NAVIGATOR, May 2001, 
http://www.ios.org/text/dcooper_misbehavioral-economics.asp?navigator. 
12. From an analytic-philosophy perspective, the use of myth goes hand in glove with 
the use of psychoanalysis. For example, Ludwig Wittgenstein considered psychoanalysis 
itself to be a form of myth. See JACQUES BOUVERESSE, WIITGENSTEIN READS FREUD 
(Carol Cosman trans., 1995). In his view, psychoanalysis could not be a science because not 
all mental events have causes. But, Wittgenstein did not apply the label "myth" in a negative 
sense. He found value in persuasive discourse. Indeed, a psychoanalytic cure may result from 
the analyst and patient mutually accepting a narrative that has no actual basis in the history 
of the individual. Verbalization in the form of narrative acceptance acts to dissolve the ill 
effects of the symptom. The danger identified by Wittgenstein consists of confusing 
psychoanalysis with science. 
13. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
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Midas). Chapter Five locates the origins of law in desire rather than in 
rationality (using The Eumenides) and expresses the hope that society 
may develop social structures better suited to promote human 
development. Each chapter consists largely of reworked material from fJ 
prior law review articles. Thus, Triumph of Venus might be seen as a 
collection of essays. Beyond the overarching theme of exploring 
economic rationality from a Hegelian and Lacanian perspective, a 
common thread links the various topics: Schroeder's desire to show 
how policy recommendations based on unsound conceptual analysis 
conflict with the exercise of human freedom. 
Part I of this Review explains Schroeder's analysis of the 
shortcomings and paradoxes associated with the concept of "perfect 
market." Part II does the same for the concept of "wealth 
maximization." Part III shows how integration of these two concepts 
into a theory of human action can be seen as destructive of human 
freedom. Part IV provides an account of the construction of social 
facts to show how persons, exercising freedom, may improve the social 
structure. Part V discusses policy suggestions based on economic 
reasoning to illustrate how Schroeder's ideas might apply in practice. 
My method is to explain Schroeder's arguments by framing them, 
where possible, in terms of analytic philosophy.14 
I .  THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS WITH PERFECT MARKETS 
Professor Schroeder explains the central role of the concept of the 
perfect market in the formation of policy recommendations: 
According to legal economists, efficiency would be achieved if the ideal 
of the perfect market were implemented. We should, therefore, modify 
our legal and political institutions so as to make the actual markets as 
nearly perfect as we can or, if that is impossible, to replicate the results of 
the perfect market as closely as possible.15 
Schroeder's critique of the "perfect market" takes two forms. First, 
she gives a general analysis of the perfect-market concept. Second, she 
critiques that concept from a Hegelian/Lacanian perspective. 
14. Professor Schroeder specifically states that certain of her arguments are designed to 
stand apart from the theories of Hegel and Lacan. I highlight these independent aspects in 
my discussion. Indeed, for many readers, the use of Hegel and Lacan may be an impediment 
to understanding. In my reading, however, I detect strains of more accessible analytic 
philosophy in the chosen references to Hegel and Lacan and draw upon these sources to 
highlight what I see at stake in her analysis. 
15. P. 107. A recent textbook on L&E avoids even reference to the ideal of the perfect 
market in its subject index. See SHA VELL, supra note 5, at 736. Instead, Shaven refers to the 
invariance version of the Coase theorem, noting that it "needs to be carefully interpreted, 
and is not necessarily a good guide for thinking, even when bargaining is apparently 
frictionless." Id. at 106. The invariance version of the Coase theorem notes that, regardless 
of the initial allocation of property rights, parties will reallocate resources in a manner that 
maximizes social welfare if we assume the absence of bargaining costs. Id. at 102. 
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According to this first critique, "Once the perfect market is achieved, 
all markets stop. Once again, this was one of Coase's points. Markets 
only exist as a means of eliminating transaction costs. When 
0 transaction costs are eliminated, markets are also necessarily 
eliminated. "16 
In essence, Schroeder's first critique argues that the perfect-market 
concept is oxymoronic - that conjoining the terms "perfect" and 
"market" is like conjoining the terms "round" and "square."17 I 
understand her observation by conceiving of a market as a structure18 
pursuant to which individuals may execute multiple bilateral contracts 
in a more efficient manner than would be possible in the absence of 
the structure.19 Just as a firm is a structure to reduce transaction costs, 
so too is a market. The firm reduces transaction costs by replacing 
bilateral contracting costs with the management structure of the firm. 
The market, rather than replacing bilateral contracting with an 
alternate structure, reduces transaction costs by lowering the costs of 
individual bilateral contracting activity. A perfect market, however, is 
characterized by the absence of transaction costs. Both firms and 
markets exist to reduce transaction costs, but without transaction costs 
there would be neither firms nor markets, as their raison d'etre has 
ceased. Thus, the aspirational goal of attaining the perfect market is a 
wish for the end of all markets.20 
16. P. 143. The dynamic of the perfect market thus resembles the dynamic of desire. 
Complete satisfaction of desire is fatal to the subject. 
17. Noam Chomsky's famous sentence: "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" 
illustrates the point. See NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX 149 
(1965). Though syntactically well formed, the sentence is semantic nonsense. To ask "I?o 
colorless green ideas sleep furiously?" is to ask a meaningless question. Similarly, to a·sk 
questions about a "perfect market" may well be to ask meaningless questions. 
18. For a simple case of market as structure, think of a village market in which persons 
periodically meet in a single location, bringing goods to trade. By coming together in a single 
market "place," at an agreed date and time, bilateral contracting costs are reduced because 
individuals need make only one round trip to the market and home again. The structure 
consists of the agreed meeting day, time, and location. This notion of an efficient structure 
reflects the notion in graph theory that the method using the least edges to connect multiple 
points in a connected graph is to designate a single point as the "center" and then connect all 
other points to that single point using edges. See, e.g., GARY CHARTRAND, INTRODUCTORY 
GRAPH THEORY (1977). Such a structure need not be limited to facilitating simple 
exchanges. In such a structure, parties may give representations and warranties relating to 
objects exchanged and also may contract for goods to be delivered at future market 
meetings. 
19. Conceived of as a structure, the market is distinguished from the actual exchange or 
contract itself. This conception of the market differs from those advanced by some critical 
legal theorists who equate the institution of contract with the market itself. See Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 625 (1982) 
(equating the institution of contract with the market itself). 
20. Professor Schroeder originally developed this critique in Jeanne L. Schroeder, The 
End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 1 12 HARV. L. REV. 483 (1998) 
[hereinafter, Schroeder, End of Market]. 
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This first critique suggests another odd conceptual feature. Though 
it is not uncommon to construct scientific models based on 
assumptions that are impossible to achieve in practice - such as 
assuming a perfect vacuum or a frictionless surface in the study of 
motion - such assumptions, if realized, would not eliminate the 
activity under study. In contrast, the existence of a perfect market is 
an assumption that, if realized, would result in the end of market 
activity.21 Thus, for Schroeder, the perfect market is not merely 
empirically impossible, it is theoretically impossible. L&E's 
shortcoming is its failure to consider the implications of using a 
theoretically impossible ideal.22 
Professor Schroeder's second critique follows from these first 
observations. Conceptually, the perfect market is an imaginary zone in 
which exchange of property objects between individual persons ceases. 
For a follower of Hegel or Lacan, however, the ongoing exchange of 
objects between persons functions as an essential component in the 
formation of human personality or subjectivity in a modem society.23 
The abstract person, as such, has no independent individuation criteria 
that allow its identification as a single thing.24 In an attempt to 
distinguish itself, the abstract person infuses its particular will in 
objects by "acquiring" or "possessing" them, thereby asserting, in 
effect, "I am the thing that possesses these objects." Such a stance, 
however, makes the subject a slave to those objects. The abstract 
person only achieves a free existence when, in a free exchange of 
objects with another abstract person, each person recognizes the other 
as an individual will via recognition of the other's rights in the object 
subject to exchange. Thus, the formation of individual identity 
requires recognition by another, which derives from the free 
contractual exchange of things. Lacan provides a similar analysis of 
exchange as essential to mental development.25 Further, for Lacan the 
21. Id. at 517. 
22. Id. at 516. 
23. See David Gray Carlson, How To Do Things With Hegel, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1377, 
1378-79 (2000) (explaining how, for Hegel, contract and exchange are essential for human 
subjectivity, not merely convenient). In this sense, the institution of property is essential in 
the formation of personality. Others have suggested that the institution of property may be 
essential for other reasons, such as solving the problem of "the commons." See, e.g., Michael 
A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 1 1 1  HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (discussing the problem of the commons and 
offering a symmetrical problem of the anticommons ). 
24. Individuation criteria consist of distinguishing characteristics that, among other 
things, allow us to identify and count particular things. The abstract person conceived of as 
merely an absolutely free will has no such characteristics. JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE 
VESTAL AND THE FASCES 27 (1998). 
25. As one commentator explains Lacan, "The ego owes its identity to the other; in 
order to be or become someone, I have to identify with something that comes from without, 
and thus with something I myself am not and have not brought about." PHILIPPE VAN 
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existence of the unconscious is a central fact of human subjectivity. 
The perfect-market assumption of complete information requires that 
persons know their own minds, but such knowledge would result in 
the destruction of personality (p. 131). Thus, to advocate a goal that 
eliminates ongoing exchange and transaction costs is to implicitly 
lobby for the elimination of human personality or subjectivity. 
Both of Schroeder's critiques indicate a conceptual inconsistency 
between the use of the perfect market as a goal and freedom. Our 
practical inability, though, to eradicate core transaction costs, such as 
time, space, and incomplete information, means that we will never 
face the death of the market by realizing its ideal, perfect form. Even 
if the perfect market is "perfectly un-free" (p. 142), something more is 
needed to show the incompatibility between the L&E project and 
actual freedom. 26 Professor Schroeder often speaks in ways that imply 
this something else might be a brand of determinism that follows from 
L&E's modeling activity.27 That path, if taken, however, leads to 
trouble. To make the anti-freedom pitch along traditional 
deterministic lines would require Schroeder to take on the arguments 
of a host of philosophers who have argued for the doctrine of 
"compatibilism" - the notion that it is consistent to believe 
simultaneously in a materialistic world governed by causation and in 
free will. 28 
HAUTE, AGAINST ADAPTATION: LACAN'S "SUBVERSION" OF THE SUBJECT 86 (Paul Crow 
& Miranda Vankerk trans., 2002). 
26. Though her critique of the perfect market does not demonstrate that L&E is anti­
freedom in a strong sense, her analysis does show how purported descriptions of what would 
happen if transaction costs were eliminated are incoherent. P. 148; cf infra note 36 (noting 
Shavell's observation about wealth maximization). 
27. See, e.g., p. 311 ("If the future was perfectly determinate and predictable, we would 
not be free - we would be totally masculine, with no room for.the feminine."). This notion 
implicitly requires adoption of a compositionality thesis to the effect that large-scale 
economic phenomena must be explained as a composite of behavior of individuals who 
exhibit the particular traits assumed by the model. Not all economists would accept such a 
restriction; some argue that large-scale economic phenomena can be modeled as if the 
individuals each operated in accord with particular traits exhibited by homo economicus. 
Such economists would not be encompassed by charges of determinism. 
28. See. e.g., DANIEL C. DENNETT, FREEDOM EVOLVES (2003); ROBERT NOZICK, 
Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice, in SOCRATIC PUZZLES 45 (1997); 
DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS (1980). Nozick's discussion of 
Newcomb's problem appeared in a somewhat different form in the Scientific American 
Magazine in 1973 and sparked a huge reader response. See ROBERT NOZICK, Reflections on 
Newcomb's Problem, in SOCRATIC PUZZLES 74 (1997). Some have argued that the great 
Hegel himself was a compatibilist of sorts. See Robert B. Pippin, Naturalness and 
Mindedness: Hegel's Compatibilism, 7 EUR. J. PHIL. 194 (1999). I do not mean to imply that 
such an argument cannot be made. I merely suggest that if she wishes to take that road, 
Professor Schroeder has a formidable task in front of her, including possible reconciliation 
with Hegelian teaching. For Alexandre Kojeve, Hegal envisioned two worlds: the 
determined, given world of nature and the historical or human world. Human freedom does 
not consist of a choice between two "givens" in the natural world but instead is the negation 
of a given through action by an individual person. ALEXANDRE KOJEVE, INTRODUCTION TO 
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Reference to Hegel presents a possible way forward because Hegel 
provides a third objection to use of the perfect market as a goal for the 
political process. For Hegel, there are three spheres of human activity 
in which ethical life or Sittlichkeit might be realized: (i) the family, (ii) 
contract or market relationships (also referred to as "civil society"), 
and (iii) the modem state.29 The structure of family life (in which 
individuals pursue common projects), as well as the structure of 
contract or market relations (in which individuals pursue private 
interests), are to be preserved, yet subordinated to the structure of the 
state (in which the overarching common project is the promotion of 
freedom for individuals). Though both are important aspects of 
human existence (and reflect aspects of the state), both the spheres of 
family life and the market are incomplete. They do not have the 
collective goal of promoting freedom and thus are inadequate to 
promote fully the development of human potential. From the 
Hegelian viewpoint, a state that concentrated solely on promoting 
efficient preference satisfaction in the sphere of market activity would 
be stuck in second gear. Such a state would fail to adopt its proper role 
of promoting human flourishing and, ultimately, freedom.3° For Hegel, 
extreme poverty and extreme wealth raises serious challenges for 
modem society because both tend to destroy a collective allegiance to 
promotion of freedom. Hegel, however, did not purport to have an 
answer to the problem of poverty, though he tentatively suggested 
expansion of markets abroad to address poverty in Prussia as a partial 
solution. From this standpoint, the L&E movement appears to be anti­
freedom, because it advocates policies that merely promote 
satisfaction of market desires.31 
Pursuit of the Hegelian critique based on the proper role of the 
state, however, must be further developed if it is to have real impact. 
L&E practitioners would, I suspect, claim that efforts to improve 
THE READING OF HEGEL 216, 222 (James H. Nichols, Jr. trans., 1980). Such a vision 
provides one basis for constructing a doctrine of compatibalism. Without more, the fact that 
economists construct models designed to predict human behavior does not allow the easy 
inference of a conflict with promotion of human freedom. 
29. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 2. Professor Schroeder does not 
develop this third Hegelian point, presumably because she wishes to avoid policy 
recommendations and, ultimately, politics. For details on how the argument might be 
elaborated, see Michel Rosenfeld, Hegel and the Dialectics of Contract, in HEGEL AND 
LEGAL THEORY 228 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1991). 
30. Terry Pinkard, Hegel's biographer, writes: 
Whereas civil society is the sphere of free individuals, political life has for its purpose the 
establishment of the conditions necessary for a free people. For this goal to be actualized, the 
state must be articulated into a set of appropriately modern governmental institutions, whose 
legitimating principle is again that of freedom, not efficiency or preference satisfaction. 
TERRY PINKARD, HEGEL: A BIOGRAPHY 486 (2000) (commenting on Philosophy of Right). 
31. Though Hegel had read Adam Smith, he did not pursue the notion that unfettered 
markets might best achieve freedom for individuals. 
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market efficiency by reducing transaction costs are strongly pro­
freedom because they facilitate the making of more exchanges by 
individuals with limited resources. As discussed above, even 
Schroeder states that such exchanges are a mechanism that individuals 
use to express their freedom. To effectively counter this type of L&E 
defense, one must provide an account of what further actions the state 
should be taking to promote freedom. In effect, Hegel's defense of the 
organization of the Prussian state must be updated for modern times. 
In part, such an approach would require an explanation of the 
governmental structures that allow individuals to see their own 
freedom reflected in the law and not merely an argument that 
extremes of wealth and poverty inhibit the development of this 
collective vision.32 Professor Schroeder, however, would like to avoid 
such political judgments. 
Though, in its present form, Professor Schroeder's analysis of the 
perfect market does not, in itself, demonstrate L&E's incompatibility 
with freedom, it does provide a psychoanalytic account that explains 
how the perfect-market concept has had such staying power in 
theoretical analysis. 
The alternate strategy for masculine economics is to compromise its 
desire and thereby substitute drive for desire - and, as Lacan famously 
asserted, all drives are death drives . . . . [T]his is the road taken by 
Posner, who seeks to avoid the unsatisfied eroticism of actual markets 
characterized by desire through the creation of a jurisprudence based on 
a hypothetical market characterized by the deathly drive of wealth 
maximization. (p. 140-41) 
The perfect market is the means toward maximizing preference 
satisfaction. To evaluate the success or failure of the perfect market as 
a means to that end, we need a measuring rod for the preferences that 
32. Two illustrations of proposals for structural change come to mind. A recent 
structural suggestion for a "Deliberation Day" comes from Bruce Ackerman and James 
Fishkin. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004). 
Deliberation Day is a proposal for a federally sponsored holiday in which individuals would 
be paid to consider candidates and issues prior to an election. Judge Posner has criticized the 
proposal. See Richard Posner, Smooth Sailing, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 41. Another 
approach consistent with Hegel's admiration for Greek culture might be to explore 
application of Aristotelian concepts linking human flourishing to inquiries in biology. For 
Aristotle, it was an easy matter to examine a plant or animal and determine whether or not it 
was thriving in its particular condition. Similarly, we might look at our current consumer 
society driven by apparently ever-improving market conditions and find that individuals, in 
fact, are not thriving. To proceed, such an approach would require development of some 
measure of human flourishing. Such measurements might be found in the measurements of 
those engaged in comparative studies of legal systems. This, at least, might motivate the 
search for further conditions that might be pursued by the State. Such an approach would be 
consistent with attempts to identify those characteristics of a system that are associated with 
economic development, eradication of disease, elimination of hunger, reduction in child 
mortality rates, etc. through ongoing comparative studies of legal systems. Charles Taylor, 
Hegel's Ambiguous Legacy for Modern Liberalism, in HEGEL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra 
note 29, at 64 (describing Hegel as a "civic humanist"). 
May 2004] Spectres of Law & Economics 1433 
we would maximize. That measure is, in general, utility, and its more 
specific surrogate, wealth. 
II. THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS WITH WEALTH MAXIMIZATION 
As Professor Schroeder has elaborated elsewhere,33 the essential 
elements of property consist of the exclusive right of one legal person 
to (i) possess, (ii) transfer, and (iii) consume (or enjoy) a property 
object. This conception of property goes back at least to Roman times. 
When society recognizes these three rights in a particular legal person 
with respect to an object, the person is said to have a "property" in the 
object. The core problem with L&E's employment of the concept of 
wealth maximization is that, though the principle of wealth 
maximization recognizes possession and transfer as components of 
property, it ignores the roles of consumption and enjoyment. Professor 
Schroeder sets up this point in Chapter Three by her critique of 
Calabresi and Melamed's analysis of property law; through six 
scenarios she illustrates how the component of enjoyment is absent 
from their theory, thus allowing for only partial explanation of the 
institution of property. The repression of enjoyment developed in 
Chapter Three is the foundation for Chapter Four's critique of the 
wealth-maximization principle because consumption results in a 
reduction of wealth and, as a logical matter, the true wealth maximizer 
would forever delay consumption or enjoyment. This observation is 
expected by Professor Schroeder to surprise people but I do not think 
it is subject to simple fix via definitions. Wealth maximization and 
consumption simply are incommensurate. 
In Posner's imaginary system, market participants do not engage in 
market transactions in order to obtain objects to be enjoyed, because no 
objects are ever enjoyed in his system. Rather, they engage in market 
transactions for the purpose of engaging in market transactions - i.e., 
they exchange one object in order to achieve its exchange value to 
acquire another object which, in turn, is exchanged in order to achieve its 
exchange value, ad infinitum (p. 269). 
Professor Schroeder uses the Midas myth to reinforce her point. In 
today's society, we use the term "Midas touch" as a term of praise or 
approval to refer to someone with a knack for making money. But, in 
the original myth, the "golden touch" prevented King Midas from 
eating - it was a curse not a beneficial attribute. Yet, this inversion of 
the myth's original meaning suggests how current ideology adopts 
wealth maximization as a desirable goal. In fact, as the myth teaches, 
emphasis on wealth maximization can be harmful rather than helpful 
as an end, particularly when it is the sole or primary end. 
33. See SCHROEDER, supra note 24, at 37. 
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Professor Schroeder additionally notes the lack of precision 
associated with the concept of "utility" maximization and explains 
how Judge Posner hoped that the substitution of the more easily 
measured "wealth" maximization would provide greater certainty. On 
closer examination, however, she finds that the substitution does not 
promote certainty unless wealth is limited to a simple measurement of 
money or money's worth.34 
Happiness (or a broad notion of utility and well-being) is 
notoriously difficult to measure, and any attempt to measure 
happiness by using a proxy such as wealth creates a distortion. The 
measurement heuristic destroys the very thing being measured. 
Wealth may be a means to achieve the end of happiness as well-being 
- wealth is something that enables individuals to enjoy life. But, when 
wealth is substituted for happiness as the measure, the logic of wealth 
maximization (as opposed to happiness or well-being maximization) 
requires the absence of enjoyment altogether. To maximize wealth is 
to enjoy nothing - the very opposite of happiness or well-being. 
Professor Schroeder sees the pure wealth maximizer as a miser who 
never spends or consumes. 
To be fair, however, the image of the L&E practitioner 
unreflectively advocating wealth maximization has become a bit of a 
caricature. Though Judge Posner advocated use of wealth 
maximization at one time, his more recent work attempts to 
incorporate other factors in the analysis.35 And, the newest L&E 
textbook expressly acknowledges that the concept of wealth 
maximization is incoherent, though Professor Shavell believes that 
careful use of the concept may nevertheless provide some insights.36 
Caricature or not, in Schroeder's analysis we find that both the 
object being maximized - wealth - and the means used to maximize 
34. Elsewhere, Schroeder notes that the concepts of wealth and utility maximization are 
sufficiently close as to be interchangeable for purposes of her critique. See SCHROEDER, 
supra note 24, at 16. 
35. Compare Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979) (advocating wealth maximization), with RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999) (advocating a pragmatic 
approach considering multiple factors). 
36. Professor Shaven writes: 
What, however, can be said of the notion of "wealth maximization," a social goal advanced 
by many scholars who have analyzed legal rules in an economically oriented manner? As I 
will now explain, (a) the goal of wealth maximization is not one employed in welfare 
economics - indeed, it is not a well-defined goal, that is, it is theoretically incoherent -
even though the impression in legal academic circles is that wealth maximization is the 
general normative goal endorsed by economists; (b) the goal of wealth maximization has 
been criticized by legal academics for reasons that are, ironically, largely consistent with 
welfare economics .... 
SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 667-68. As a matter of terminology, from a pragmatic standpoint 
a concept that has utility is not, strictly speaking, meaningless. 
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it - the perfect market - conceptually display self-destructive 
tendencies: exchange, subjectivity, and enjoyment all cease when the 
logic of these two concepts is ruthlessly pursued in any model. The use 
of these concepts to guide policy can promote social structures that 
hinder freedom. To see how this is so, Schroeder employs a theory of 
human action. 
Ill. A HUMAN-ACTION MODEL 
From Professor Schroeder's Hegelian/Lacanian perspective, the 
market economy is erotic in the technical sense that the desires of 
individual actors drive market exchange.37 Individuals experience 
desire as a "lack" - the lack of some lost object that, once regained, 
will make them whole and satisfy their desires. They pursue 
acquisition of objects through exchange transactions to cure this lack. 
The object cause of desire that each individual pursues, however -
the object a in Lacanian parlance - does not ever truly inhere in the 
particular objects acquired. Thus, particular object acquisition never 
satisfies desire. Desires are unstable - the opposite of a type of 
phenomena susceptible to easy modeling. The notion that policy might 
be directed toward satisfaction of desires appears hopeless. How 
might any policymaker discern just which desires to maximize? 
Professor Schroeder's analysis becomes clear against the outline of 
a theory of human action based on the work of analytic philosophers. 
Below, I sketch an outline of one such theory of human action using 
the concepts of information,38 beliefs,39 desires, preferences, and 
action.40 The outline will show how, in a more familiar theoretical 
framework, desires display the same type of inconstancy as that 
theorized by Lacan, thus reflecting the challenges facing any modeling 
enterprise. 
37. Schroeder, End of Market, supra note 20, at 492. The root desire that underpins all 
the particular desires that economists believe are satisfied in markets is the passionate desire 
for recognition. For Hegel, this desire originates with a person's love for other persons and is 
stronger than particular desires for food or shelter. See Arthur J. Jacobson, Hegel's Legal 
Plenum, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 877, 895-900 (1989). According to Hegel, market exchange is 
the only mechanism suited to achieve this recognition. Id. 
38. Information consists of the sense data received from ordinary experience. 
39. Individuals form beliefs based on information. Beliefs may consist of simple 
propositions, such as "The cat is on the mat," or law-like conditionals, such as "If I drop this 
ball, then it will fall to the ground." 
40. This model derives primarily from my reading of Donald Davidson. See DONALD 
DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS (2d ed. 2001). The model also borrows from 
Jon Eisler, particularly JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF 
RATIONALITY (1983), and Kenneth Arrow, Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences 
(Cowles Comm'n Paper No. 48, 1951), reprinted in THE POLICY SCIENCES 129 (Daniel 
Lerner & Harold D. Lasswell eds., 1951). It is substantially similar to models of the rational 
homo economicus used by economists. 
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An individual person acquires information about the world and 
then forms beliefs based on this acquired information set. Separately, 
the individual has a set of desires.41 (We can assume that these desires 
vary in intensity and may be rank ordered based on this level of 
intensity.) Based on the individual's belief set, the individual uses 
means-ends reasoning to identify a subset of her desires that might be 
satisfied by taking one or a series of actions (the "realizable set" of 
desires). The individual then constructs a baseline rank ordering of 
desires from this realizable set. The individual, however, then modifies 
the baseline rank ordering by making adjustments for the perceived 
costs in time, money, effort, reputation, and risk associated with 
satisfaction of the desires in the realizable set. When adjusted for 
these various costs, the baseline ordering of desires from the realizable 
set may change, resulting in a second ordering which lists the actual 
preferences held by actors. An individual takes action to satisfy the 
desire that ranks first in the list of preferences at the end of this two­
stage ordering process. Thus, the individual's action is explained. 
When the action results in satisfaction of the desire (or in failure), 
the individual moves to the next item on the list and takes action to 
satisfy that second desire (which now has moved to first on the list).42 
In the meantime, however, the individual continues to acquire 
information about the world that may modify the individual's set of 
beliefs. This modification may, in tum, lead to a modification in the 
adjusted rank ordering of preferences (either because the perceived 
realizable set of desires changes, the individual's evaluation of the 
costs associated with attaining these desires changes, or both). 
Further, the desires of the individual may change (either by a change 
in the set of the objects of desire, a change in the intensity of a desire, 
or both) for reasons unrelated to the acquisition of new information. 
41. In Lacanian terms, these desires do not consist of mere animal needs for basic life 
requirements. Desire exceeds need. See VAN HAUTE, supra note 25, at 24, 104, 106. The 
contemporary example of McDonald's restaurants illustrates how wide the gulf may be 
between need and desire. The documentary Super Size Me recently won a directing award at 
Sundance film festival for chronicling the deterioration in the health of filmmaker Morgan 
Spurlock who ate nothing but McDonald's food for a month. See Brian Braeker, The Real 
Price of a Big Mac, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4078903/. Though 
the McDonald's Corporation is changing its marketing emphasis toward healthier food 
products and elimination of the "super size" option in response to lawsuits and adverse 
publicity occasioned by the film, the phenomenon does indicate how an individual's desires 
often conflict with basic needs. 
42. Note that in this model, satisfaction of one desire does not lead to satisfaction in 
general. The individual is never satisfied, but moves from item to item on the list. In this 
sense, the individual is never complete or whole. In Lacanian terms, the individual is always 
looking for the lost object of desire, which never is found. Instead the individual focuses on 
particular objects, thinking that this particular object may be the one that satisfies. It never 
does, except perhaps momentarily in what Lacan calls jouissance. Even jouissance, however, 
as actually experienced by individual persons, is ephemeral and partial. 
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Rationality in this model consists of means-ends reasoning with 
certain formal properties.43 In contrast, we typically do not refer to an 
individual's particular set of desires (or the levels of intensity of those 
desires) as either rational or irrational. Instead, desires simply are 
taken as given. Nevertheless, we may attempt to give a causal 
explanation or a narrative to account for why an individual has a 
particular desire. In this sense, some desires might be predetermined 
whereas others might be the product of spontaneous free choice. 
Given the forgoing, there is a surface tension that might lead one 
to believe it difficult or impossible to maximize satisfaction of desires 
in the market place. In a market setting, the possible objects of the 
individual's desire (as consumer) are various goods and services. 
Because the individual creates its ordered list of preferences by 
adjusting for various costs, we might imagine increased demand for a 
good when that good bears a lower price rather than a higher price. 
Similarly, in a market setting, the possible objects of the individual's 
desire (as producer) include wealth accumulation, so the individual 
would tend to produce those goods and services that will most increase 
her wealth. This would suggest production of goods and services that 
can be exchanged for a high price, relative to cost of production. 
Mathematical modeling, however, reveals that the contradiction 
between the desires of consumers and producers is only apparent.44 
The empirical reason why some desires always will go unsatisfied is 
scarcity. The market for production and exchange is characterized by 
scarcity. Scarcity exists both in limitations on goods and services that 
may be acquired and in limitations on the resources of individuals 
available to trade in the market. Thus, the desires of the market 
participants may not all be satisfied. The rank ordering of preferences, 
however, results in satisfaction of individual desires through the 
market in a manner that maximizes fulfillment of desire in light of this 
scarcity.45 
43. For example, we assume that an individual can rank order any two preferences (or 
express indifference) and, if A is preferred to B and 8 is preferred to C, then A is preferred 
to C. All such notions of rationality, however, are purely instrumental and do not accord 
with the Hegelian notion that relates rationality to free identification of ends by individual 
persons. 
44. Kenneth Arrow demonstrates how formalization usefully reconciles the apparent 
contradiction between the verbal formalizations. If consumers seek to purchase products 
with low prices while producers seek to provide products with high prices, it would appear 
that the two groups work in opposite directions. This is not the case, however, as the 
apparently inconsistent goals actually result in creation of equilibrium. See Arrow, supra 
note 40. 
45. In a few places, Professor Schroeder speaks as if realization of the perfect market 
would result in the end of desire. See p. 143. This is not clearly so. If the perfect market 
merely eliminates the subset of costs identified as "transaction costs" (i.e., the costs 
associated with bargaining) then scarcity would still exist and some desires would go 
unsatisfied, though all trading would cease because no individual would be able to improve 
her position by further exchange. Only if the set of transaction costs is broadened to include 
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There are several things to note about this model. First, it 
hypothesizes a form of abstract desire46 uninflulinced by the world of 
beliefs, costs (transaction and otherwise), and scarcity. In fact, 
however, we only experience desire filtered through our systems of 
belief and means-ends reasoning in a world of scarcity. Thus, our 
initial ordering of desires is derivative.47 The presence of various costs 
further biases our preference ordering. Thus, an actor may never 
correctly identify his or her "true" preference ordering as it would 
exist in the absence of transaction costs. As illustration, consider the 
Dr. Seuss story about green eggs and ham in which a fantastical 
creature spends the majority of the plot protesting to Sam-I-Am that 
he "does not like green eggs and ham. "48 The protagonist suffers from 
an information problem. When the creature finally tries the product, it 
likes green eggs and ham and radically reorders its preferences, 
placing green eggs and ham at the top of the list. We are left 
wondering what preference ordering would result if the creature next 
tried blue eggs and ham. Yet, our only source of information about the 
creature's desires and preferences comes from statements made by the 
creature and our observations of the creature's behavior. With 
incomplete information, a consumer does not know her own mind (or, 
at least, what her preference ordering would look like in the absence 
of transaction costs) and neither do we. 
Policy recommendations may be aimed at passing laws that affect 
the status-quo preference ordering of actors either by eliminating 
some costs or imposing others. As suggested by the model above, 
all costs, including costs of production, would desire cease in a perfect market. Professor 
Schroeder is well aware of this point but does not always indicate when she is speaking about 
the narrower or broader definition of transaction costs. It is only the narrow definition of 
transaction costs that holds any practical interest, the latter being a world in which "manna 
falls from heaven" as Professor Schroeder quotes Professor Calabresi. 
46. For illustrative purposes, we might tentatively identify this abstract, unfiltered desire 
in the model with the psychoanalytic concept of "drive." For Lacan, all drives amount to 
death drives. If this abstract unfiltered desire were to be satisfied in a moment of ultimate 
jouissance, as a conceptual matter the individual would cease to exist. To be an individual in 
society is precisely to move between the poles of individual desires and their momentary, but 
ultimately incomplete, satisfaction. See Nestor A. Braunstein, Desire and Jouissance in the 
Teachings of Lacan, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO LACAN 102 (Jean-Michel Rabate 
ed., 2003). It is from this perspective that Professor Schroeder critiques L&E's fascination 
with the perfect market. If the perfect market were achieved, the market would end. Pursuit 
of the L&E research agenda thus amounts to a strategy for dealing with drive. 
47. We need to enter the world of belief and means-ends reasoning to make sense of the 
concepts of scarcity and preference ordering. The notion that a useful concept of acontextual 
preferences may not exist is not new to legal scholarship. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, 
Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217 (1993). If a preference 
is a function of an initial entitlement allocated by law (such as illustrated by the so-called 
"endowment effect"), then a policymaker is unable to identify a simple preference and the 
best method to satisfy it. Id. This will be a problem whenever a preference is an artifact of 
given positive laws. 
48. DR. SEUSS, GREEN EGGS AND HAM (1960). 
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however, such actions merely reshuffle preferences as finally ordered 
by the second preference ordering. It is not possible to say whether 
any particular reshuffling will bring a group of actors closer to 
maximizing satisfaction of their priority ordering of true, unfiltered 
desires. Policy recommendations also may be aimed at altering belief 
structures. Because an actor's structure of beliefs give rise to the first 
base ordering of preferences we again find a reshuffling, but without 
assurance that the change brings us any closer to maximization of 
satisfaction of unfiltered desire. We observe that actual preference 
orderings represent compromises - the problem of the second best.49 
We may not infer the identity of the first best or how to get there from 
where we stand.50 Thus, policy recommendations framed in terms of 
achieving the first best either are delusional or have another aim.51 
One such aim might be to influence the nature of belief sets. One 
direction that belief sets might be altered is in the direction of making 
belief sets more uniform across individuals. For example, one might 
attempt to foster the belief that wealth maximization should be the 
goal of each actor.52 To the extent manipulation of the belief set is 
successful, it simplifies modeling and enhances prediction. We find 
evidence of manipulation of the belief set in our popular culture 
toward wealth maximization; examples include the inversion of the 
Midas myth discussed above, the notion that "greed is good" from the 
famous line in the Hollywood movie "Wall Street," and the adage "If 
you are so smart, why aren't you rich?" Advertisements consist of 
nothing but attempts to modify belief sets, by everything from 
providing simple information to more active influence through 
suggestion of counterfactual rules (e.g., if you owned this car, the 
opposite sex would love you). The consumer society is fueled by the 
notion that one should acquire ever fancier and more sophisticated 
physical possessions. The consumer society "works" even if consumers 
do not actually consume or enjoy the objects that they buy, so long as 
consumers purchase. 
' 
From the foregoing, we can see how the L&E movement might fit 
the Lacanian discourse of the university as proposed by Professor 
Schroeder.53 It can contribute to entrenchment of a particular ideology 
49. P. 1 10; see R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 
REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). 
50. P. 1 10; Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 49, at 1 1 .  
51. See Jeanne L .  Schroeder, Rationality i n  Law and Economics Scholarship, 79 OR. L. 
REV. 147 (2000). Indeed, one of the central challenges facing policy recommendations based 
on economic research is the problem of the second best. In light of this theory, economics 
must explain how policy recommendations should be made. 
52. Economists often make the simplifying assumption that persons act to maximize 
wealth when modeling actors operating in commercial settings. 
53. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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by maintaining or altering belief sets of actors in the direction of 
predictable market behavior that facilitates modeling. 
Though the human-action model outlined above does not purport 
to suggest a cause for an actor's unfiltered set of desires, at the level of 
a system of beliefs, the initial ordering of desires may be manipulated. 
To the extent that the belief set includes normative judgments such as 
"it is rational to maximize wealth and one ought to do what is 
rational," then operative desires are manipulated. There is, of course, 
nothing wrong in the abstract with attempting to influence belief sets. 
Indeed, our whole political system presumes a "marketplace of ideas" 
in which different views may be expressed in the hope of persuading 
voters. Such activity, however, is identified as political, not scientific. 
The rhetoric of science involves the notion that you do not have a 
choice (e.g., what goes up, must come down). Thus, the treatment of 
L&E as science - the injunction that you must do X because it 
promotes market efficiency - amounts to a political judgment 
masquerading as a scientific one. 
As a factual matter, preferences change over time (and, indeed, 
preferences may change because of the passage of time as, for 
example, a person's appetite for savings might increase as one 
approaches retirement age). Changes in the structure of our economic 
and political institutions may cause changes in individual preference 
orderings, both by altering costs of certain choices and by influencing 
beliefs. An individual's past attempts to satisfy desires may, 
themselves, influence the reordering of the current realizable set of 
desires. Although economic models do not focus on explaining the 
origin of desires (i.e., the wants of the individuals in the marketplace) ,  
the policy recommendations made by legal economists will, if 
implemented, in fact shape future preference orderings of the 
realizable set of desires of the individual.54 We may applaud an 
individual's exercise of choice when the individual consciously makes 
that choice with a view to shaping her future preferences for the 
better; this is a form of character building advocated by Aristotle and 
discussed by Elster, among others. The implementation of a policy 
recommendation may have the same effect of shaping future 
preferences; but, it will lack the laudatory element of choice if that 
policy recommendation comes packaged as scientifically mandated, 
rather than as a choice to be made. Thus, how the policy 
recommendation is presented can adversely impact the exercise of 
54. To be sure, this is a feature of all policy recommendations, not simply those 
advocated by legal economists, because implementation of policy alters relative costs of 
pursuing different actions. The critique aimed at L&E is aimed at the rhetoric used to 
advance the policy and not at the simple fact that implementation of the policy will alter 
preferences. 
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freedom. This is my take on the most serious charge Professor 
Schroeder makes against L&E. 
IV. THINGS THAT Do NOT EXIST 
Professor Schroeder expresses the hope that positive social 
changes may be on the horizon, echoing the Hegelian faith in progress 
through history. To understand how change in social structure is 
possible, we need to consider some of its basic features. In reading 
Lacan and related commentary, negative-existence claims abound: 
"Woman" does not exist, the "Big Other" does not exist, etc.55 These 
negative-existence claims often are claims about the structure of social 
reality, but they typically are not explained in a manner that permits 
understanding of what is at stake. We need this understanding so as to 
evaluate Professor Schroeder's hope expressed at the end of Triumph 
of Venus that a change for the better in the social order (the "Big 
Other") may be just around the corner (p. 311) .  To understand how 
positive social change is possible, one simply needs to recognize that 
social reality is constructed through performative acts. Performative 
acts create relationships by virtue of verbal behavior such as the 
assertion "I do" in the marriage ceremony. In this sense we might 
make the negative-existence claim that social facts "do not exist" or 
are "unreal." 
To be sure, social reality presents an ontological challenge. The 
analytic philosophers clearly frame the problem.56 What does it mean 
to say that "Jack and Jill are married?" When we ask such a question 
we are asking for an account of the metaphysical status of social and 
legal facts. We believe that statements expressed by sentences such as 
this can be true or false, yet the truth conditions for such statements 
differ from truth conditions for statements expressed by sentences 
such as "The cat is on the mat." In the latter case, the sentence 
expresses a brute fact.57 The truth or falsity of this statement can be 
55. P. 306; see also VERHAEGHE, supra note 8, and almost any work by Slavoj Zifok, 
see, e.g., SLAVOJ ZIZEK, ENJOY YOUR SYMPTOM!: JACQUES LACAN IN HOLLYWOOD AND 
OUT 58-9 (rev. ed. 2001). 
56. My account is based primarily on the work of J. L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS 
WITH WORDS (1962), and JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 
(1995). 
57. I expect a Lacanian initially might strongly disagree with my use of a 
correspondence theory of truth. "[For Lacan, t]he world about which we speak and in which 
we live is no 'brute' reality; it is itself already mediated and structured by the signifiers of 
language, which allow it to appear as a meaningful and differentiated environment 
(Umwelt)." VAN HAUTE, supra note 25, at 10-11. I use it here, however, for its illustrative 
power. Indeed, in Professor Schroeder's view, the Lacanian Real, though not the natural 
world, "includes our sense that there is a natural world external to our thoughts and dreams, 
something more permanent than our fleeting human lives." Schroeder, End of Market, supra 
note 20, at 500. 
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ascertained by looking at the world. In the case of the marriage, 
however, we assert a social fact and no amount of looking at the 
present state of the world will help us. The truth or falsity of a present­
tense statement asserting a brute fact does not depend on the 
occurrence of a past ceremony. Rather, its truth consists in a 
correspondence between the statement and the state of the world.58 In 
contrast, the truth or falsity of the present-tense statement asserting a 
social fact depends both on the present state of the world and on the 
successful performance of a ceremony at some past time. The 
ceremony, as an event with a beginning, a middle and an end, has 
come and gone - it no longer exists, and its very existence in the past 
was merely performative. Nevertheless, people take actions based on 
the "existence" of social facts to the same extent that they would open 
a door before attempting to walk through it. 
Though I hope we can understand the above sense in which social 
facts are "unreal," there is another sense in which various objects and 
concepts do not exist in the Lacanian system. For Lacan, the "Real" is 
that which escapes language and symbolization. It stands for that 
aspect of the truth that remains unspoken - that which escapes 
symbolization. In the abstraction of modeling, many aspects of reality 
escape symbolization. For Lacan, the realm of law, language, and 
symbolization is theorized as "masculine" whereas that aspect of truth 
that remains unsymbolized is theorized as "feminine." The famous 
Lacanian notion that "Woman does not exist" is merely a statement 
that the feminine always escapes symbolization - for that which is 
symbolized is, by definition, masculine. "Woman" does not exist in the 
58. I do not expect to sell critical theorists or anyone else on a correspondence theory of 
truth in this essay nor do I want to enter the debate over whether the nature of the 
correspondence consists of something like the structure of the sentence "picturing" a portion 
of the world a la Wittgenstein's inquiries or speculate on whether the relationship is 
fundamental in the sense of Plato's doctrine of "participation." I do want to suggest that 
such a theory accords with our common-sense manner of speaking and thinking and that the 
contrast between brute and social facts has explanatory utility. Even within analytic 
philosophy, serious debates exist over whether a rigorous concept of truth can ever be 
expressed outside a purely formal language. Compare Alfred Tarski, The Concept of Truth 
.in Formalized Languages, in LOGIC, SEMANTICS, META-MATHEMATICS 152 (J. H. Woodger 
trans., Hackett 2d ed. 1983) (arguing that formalization of truth as satisfaction by 
correspondence between sentences and "reality" can only occur within the confines of a 
formal model), with Richard Montague, English as a Formal Language, in FORMAL 
PHILOSOPHY, SELECTED PAPERS OF RICHARD MONTAGUE 188 (Richard H. Thomason ed., 
2d ed. 1976) (suggesting that English may be formalized using set-theoretic semantics by 
providing a set-theoretic model of a fragment of English). Similarly, I accept that even the 
expression of a brute fact requires the use of language with whatever limitations accompany 
use of language. This does not, however, lead me to toss either common sense or science out 
the window as arbitrary or culturally relative in the way that the construction of social facts 
is relative. See generally RONALD N. GIERE, SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS (1999); NORMAN 
LEVITT, PROMETHEUS BEDEVILED (1998) (arguing against notions of scientific relativism). 
As the philosopher Ian Hacking wryly notes, there is little point in writing about the social 
construction of the Federal Reserve Bank because it so obviously is a social construction. 
IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 13 (1999). 
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symbolic order precisely because the feminine (or at least a portion of 
the feminine) is not part of the symbolic order. 
How do we reconcile these two very different ideas of "does not 
exist" in order to understand how society might be poised at a 
moment in history in which things might change for the better? 
Particularly, we need to understand the possibility of progress if the 
Lacanian Real is part of a human psychical structure that does not 
change. 
Possible reconciliation comes from the simple recognition of the 
way in which social reality is constructed as outlined above. To express 
hope that things may improve, all Schroeder needs to do is 
acknowledge that performative acts, such as ceremonies, construct 
social facts. As the forms of ceremonies, as well as their aims, are 
contingent and malleable the possibility for change comes from 
education - the provision of information to persons as belief sets 
undergo change. Changing the parameters of ceremonies can alter 
contingent social structures and thereby promote human freedom in 
ways that physical laws determining brute facts may not be altered. 
Such changes can occur even if the structure of our mental life does 
not change. This, I take it, is the basis for Professor Schroeder's 
optimism expressed at the end of Triumph of Venus. 
Nevertheless, one implication is that if the symbolic order were to change 
in some fundamental sense, then our sexuality would necessarily also 
change - and vice versa. If men could, in fact, define their subjectivity 
otherwise than as superiority over an abjected femininity, if women 
could define their femininity rather than implicitly accepting their 
definition by men, and if the two sexes could recognize each other as 
truly equal albeit different, then the very definition of sexual identity 
would change. This has not yet happened, but, at least for an increasingly 
large segment of society, it is considered appropriate . (p. 311) 
Thus, Professor Schroeder rejects the notion that Lacanian theory 
requires the subjection of women in the symbolic order to permit 
creation of masculine subjectivity. This does not mean, however, that 
change can be accomplished through merely willing such change to 
occur. Instead, a collective change in intention must occur and that 
change must be in the law and other symbolic structures of social 
reality. 
V. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
On reading Triumph of Venus I am left feeling as though I gained 
some valuable methodological insights but that, nevertheless, 
Professor Schroeder's project is, as of now, incomplete. Some progress 
is evident: there are some traditional economists already worrying 
about some of the problems Professor Schroeder identifies and at least 
some legal economists are finally paying lip service to methodological 
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concerns that trend in the direction of the return to Coase that 
Schroeder advocates. I, too, support study of actual markets as a 
precursor to policy recommendations. That said, the incompleteness 
of Schroeder's work may stem from a lack of examples indicating how 
use of economic analysis of law might be helpful or harmful (in 
addition to the harm caused by masquerading as science). I offer two 
examples, both tentative and potentially controversial, to frame 
Schroeder's position. I find such an application of theory to concrete 
situations needed for more complete understanding. 
Certainly one positive fallout from the L&E movement's focus on 
economic analysis might be its role in the demotion of the importance 
of antitrust law. During the 1970's, in particular, the government 
focused much regulatory effort on policy aimed at close management 
of the economy. That effort has receded and we appear to be no worse 
off (and many would suggest we are better off) for this development.59 
One might see the fading of the importance of antitrust law as the 
result of a methodological reflection prompted by L&E that led to 
greater modesty about what government policy can and cannot 
successfully achieve. The problems caused by unreflective confidence 
in the adequacy of results obtained from application of L&E 
methodology come not from such limiting results but rather from 
positive policy recommendations that do not differ in kind from the 
very ideal of management of the economy enshrined in antitrust law 
that the L&E movement, in its early days, helped to counteract. 
A current, positive example of an appropriate return to Coase 
might be the approach of the economist, Hernando de Soto. De Soto 
conducted an exhaustive empirical study of the land registration 
systems in third-world countries. He identified the tremendous cost 
and inefficiency confronting those who would register their property 
interests as an obstacle that prevents full utilization of assets. In his 
analysis, unregistered land operates as "dead" capital, unable to 
function as collateral for economic expansion. The solution de Soto 
identified is to streamline the property-registration process so that 
those in the third world may convert dead capital to live capital by 
registering their property interests to be recognized and protected by 
the state.60 His recommendations are, in scope, modest and follow 
59. Some commentators not wedded to the laissez-faire L&E tradition have begun to 
argue that we should reinvigorate, not abandon, antitrust doctrine. See, e.g. , Reza Dibadj, 
Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745 (2004) (arguing that traditional L&E has 
misinterpreted the intent of antitrust law and proposing a reinvigorated competition law). 
60. De Soto presents his study in HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: 
WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000). Some 
third-world countries have listened to de Soto and preliminary indications are positive. See 
Kerry A. Dolan, A New Kind of Entitlement, FORBES, Dec. 23, 2002, at 320. De Soto's 
approach, however, is not without its critics. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets, 
Racial Spaces and the Role of Critical Race Theory in the Struggle for Community Control of 
Investments: An Institutional Class Analysis, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1037 (2000). 
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from empirical study of actual markets. The approach is incremental 
- it does not require adoption of a sweeping ideology or radical 
change telling people how to run their lives. Rather, the change is 
technical in nature and allows individuals to reap the benefits of an 
existing property regime at lower cost. 
In addition to concrete illustrations, I would like to see some 
analysis of the types of social structures that promote (or at least are 
compatible with) the well-being of individuals. In the absence of such 
an analysis, I am unable to share Professor Schroeder's optimism that 
a positive societal paradigm shift is about to occur. Indeed, though the 
structure of various social realities is contingent (and thus subject to 
modification) in ways that the reality explored by hard sciences is not, 
this does not mean that social structures are easy to change. The best 
metaphor I have seen for characterizing social reality is its comparison 
to "magma," indicating both that it is a layered hierarchy, as theorized 
by the philosopher John Searle, but also relatively intractable.61 As 
indicated above, one avenue that might be developed from a Hegelian 
perspective would be to further define the characteristics of the state 
needed to promote human freedom and flourishing beyond facilitation 
of market exchanges. Ultimately, I believe projects of this sort must 
end with politics, a direction that Professor Schroeder is unwilling to 
travel. 
Policymakers face the task of making decisions with or without 
analysis informed by economic thinking. I, for one, would rather have 
the policymakers armed with economic analysis than nothing. The 
caveat is that such information should not be relied upon to the 
exclusion of other possibly relevant considerations. We need, 
however, at least a hint of what those other legitimate considerations 
might be. Notwithstanding silence on this point, Triumph of Venus 
provides a valuable reminder that policy recommendations typically 
are not matters of fact but matters of choice. To the extent a particular 
rhetoric claims otherwise, the chances are good that an attempt is 
afoot to limit freedom by denying choice. 
61. See CORNELIUS CASTORIADUS, THE IMAGINARY INSTITUTION OF SOCIETY 182 
(Kathleen Blarney trans., MIT Press 1987). 
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